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 The discussion on Hobbes’s “doctrine of politics” is confronted 
with J. F. Spitz’s methodically challenging standpoint: the latter radi-
cally refutes Hobbes’s theory of the State and sovereignty, deeming it 
to be a fatal epochal trap. This work approaches Hobbes through ac-
knowledgement of the principal insights of political theory with re-
gard to the conception of State as the politico-juridical project of 
modernity (A. Passerin d’Entrèves, Q. Skinner). Relying on the said 
insights, and building upon a critical scrutiny of Hobbes’s Leviathan, 
the author shows that the epistemological status of the “state of na-
ture” concept is crucial for the understanding of Hobbes’s theory of 
the sovereign State. In so doing, he must resolve the following query: 
is the state of nature a logical construction aspiring to an ontological 
status, or rather a hypothetical state which outlines the historical con-
stellation of Hobbes’s time? Instead of the struggle of covetous indi-
viduals for power, the main drawback of the state of nature proves to 
be the fact that people are lethally drawn apart and set against one 
another by their religious and political beliefs. There can be no last-
ing politico-juridical triumph over such a state of religious and civil 
wars unless the tasks of the representative sovereign are diachroni-
cally perceived as society-making. If and when, however, the sover-
eign should successfully fulfil his fundamental society-making task, 
the developed civil society would no longer find suitable the initial 
type of the sovereign absolute State. It would then require a new type 
– the liberal and democratic State. 
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A Methodical Remark: Sovereignty as a Trap? 
 The central challenge I wish to tackle is the radical refutation of 
Hobbes’s theory of State sovereignty, as expounded in a quite severe but 
also stimulating fashion by Jean-Fabien Spitz, contemporary French political 
philosopher and historian of ideas. According to his fundamental thesis, 
which he put forward in his important study of J. Locke’s political theory 
(2001), one must finally realise that the theory of sovereignty is not a logical 
prerequisite for modern constitutionalism, but, on the contrary, the chief ob-
stacle to the possibility of it being apprehended and established. 
 Spitz’s critical argumentation can be summarized as follows: 
 Hobbes’s problem – freedom made possible by the State, engenders a 
new and even more difficult problem – in which way is it possible to defend 
freedom against the State? 
 Hobbes is a radical individualist. The individual is not a moral being, but 
a being of passion. The anthropological prerequisites for individualism (man 
is the centre of the urge of enjoyment) lead directly to the domination of the 
concept of sovereignty, taken in its most radical sense of pure arbitrariness: 
if people are dispersed individuals, the will of each constantly opposed to 
that of all others, how else could their unity be apprehended if not as sub-
mission to the will of some representative sovereign? Such a redefinition of 
man as a passionate, urge-driven being incapable of natural accord with his 
fellow beings regarding the norms of justice, i.e. the natural and objective 
order of values, causes a destruction of politics in its co-constitutive connec-
tion with the law and justice. 
 The approach described above permits a single line of thinking: the ac-
cord as regards the common legal norm is a willed and artificial process – 
fully determined by prudential reasons – which presupposes the submission 
of all to the understanding and will of the sovereign. It is a voluntary sub-
mission to the sovereign’s will. This artificial unanimity, instead of being 
based on the mind which discovers legal norms whereby nature determines 
the relations between human beings, is in fact based on passion which delib-
erates the means of its optimal satisfaction. Thus it is the sovereign who is 
the source of norms, and the law is subordinate to the power (puissance) 
from which it results. Hobbes’s political theory is a logically necessary con-
sequence of his anthropological premises. 
 Consequently, if all common norms are artificial and a result of some 
contract, politics inevitably become nothing more than a pragmatic instru-
ment for achieving maximum satisfaction of individual desires. 
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 If society is no longer conceived as a natural order connected with the 
more comprehensive order of societas humana, the political artefact be-
comes the sole basis of society’s unity and identity. 
 If unity of the social body is effectuated only through political power, 
society is in fact a mere nothingness of atomised individuals who definitely 
do not make up a “society”, “body” or “people”. Such a “society” does not 
have (nor could it have) an autonomous existence, which would enable it to 
set limits to the political instrument it needs, for the said political instrument 
is the more constitutive factor of the two. 
 The problem becomes unsolvable: one cannot simultaneously want a 
power sufficiently strong to ensure security and sufficiently limited so as not 
to degenerate into tyranny. In such conditions, the theorists of sovereignty 
had no difficulty in proving that the solution lies in the concept of supreme 
and unlimited power.1 For power limited by the right of individuals to pass 
critical judgement on it would not be limited, but simply nonexistent. 
 Therein lies the trap of the concept of sovereignty – what is more, the 
“charm of Hobbesism” which is fatal to freedom. But one must resist them, 
and come to realise that there exists a natural community of moral beings, 
and that “le pouvoir n’est pas à lui même sa propre norme, et sa légitimité 
peut reposer non pas sur le seul consentement arbitraire de ceux qui y sont 
 
1 The problem is definitely not unsolvable: political power can be both absolute and limited, 
both sufficiently strong and sufficiently limited. Spitz himself indicates it in his book on Bodin, 
in which he proves that there are no logical impediments preventing the notion of sovereignty to 
be conceived simultaneously as absolute power and limited power. He seems, however, to be 
seized by a strange obsession when it comes to Hobbes. On the other hand, when analysing 
Bodin’s conception of sovereignty, Spitz begins by acknowledging that the “birth of the concept 
of legislative sovereignty” is the capital revolution in the history of political theories. The ab-
soluteness feature is not problematic at all; the matter at issue is not arbitrary power, but a de-
scription of “perfect sovereignty”, i.e. of a power capable of performing lawful regulation of the 
community. The notion of the sovereign as legislator playing a creative role in the production of 
law is an “innovation majeure” as regards the French constitutionalist tradition. It is an essential 
historical shift from a passive and instrumentalized medieval power to a power active and inno-
vative, which is indispensable to the new, dynamic and development-oriented society in the 
making. In Spitz’s judgement, Bodin is justified in asserting that “seul une souveraineté sans 
supérieur, sans partage, et sans droit de résistance répond à cette exigence”. Limitation and divi-
sion of power, as well as the right to resistance, are by no means guarantees of the community’s 
freedom. In fact, they would present a fatal impediment to the active implementation of the 
legislative function. As an apt illustration of his point, Spitz approvingly quotes the English 
parliamentary Thomas Hedley (1610), who stated: “This kingdom enjoys the benefits and ad-
vantages of an absolute monarchy and a free State... Let no one think that freedom and sover-
eignty are incompatible, and that whatever is given to one of them must be taken away from the 
other; rather they are twin sisters and are in such fine accord that one cannot subsist for long 
without the other”. Nonetheless, here too he deems it necessary to include occasional remarks 
on Bodin being “Hobbes’s antipode”, and on the untenability of the thesis that Bodin’s and 
Hobbes’s theories of sovereignty are linked by a line of “evolution” (Spitz, 1998: 6-10, 16-7, 
21; cf. Bodin, 2002; Lalović, 2002a). 
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assujettis, mais sur sa conformité à la norme de la communauté prépolitique” 
(Spitz, 2001: 9-12; italics added). 
 Consequently, we must be wary of Hobbes and not fall prey to his fatal 
charm and influence. Hobbes’s theory of the State and sovereignty as a 
whole is rejected as a major epistemological obstacle to pondering the logic 
of political power and to the establishment of genuine prospects of political 
freedom in modern times. 
 What is it, therefore, that is so bemusingly debatable in Hobbes’s Levia-
than, in his new science of politics and of the State? Is sovereignty (of the 
State) truly such a fatal trap? 
 
Conceptions of Sovereignty in Political Theory 
 Being faced with such a challenge as to the character and meaning of 
Hobbes’s science of politics in general, and his theory of sovereign power in 
particular, we must seek the right answer in contemporary political theory, 
which is systematically preoccupied with the modern State issue. It goes 
without saying that the scope of this work allows but a very brief reminder 
of the basic insights regarding State sovereignty. In no other way can we es-
tablish an interpretational approach that can be appropriate for the compre-
hension of Hobbes’s political thought (Lalović, 2005). 
 According to the methodically decisive branch of contemporary theory of 
the State (Passerin d’Entrêves, 1969, 11962), sovereignty (as the fundamen-
tal characteristic of the State) is eminently a politico-juridical concept, speci-
fying the meaning of the State not as mere force or might, but as institution-
alised power or lawful system. The concept of sovereignty must be per-
ceived, logically and historically, as a trans-epochal project of transforma-
tion of force into power by the mediation of law (droit), thus subjecting force 
to laws (lois). Accordingly, the historical process of State formation can in 
itself be perceived as the problem of formation and final acceptance of sov-
ereignty. The said acceptance implies the acknowledgement that there is a 
unique supreme power in each independent, national political community, 
that it is both founded on law and generates law, and that it is the cohesive 
element of the community as a whole. The principal feature of sovereign 
power is its legislative function, whereby the sphere to which sovereignty 
applies is specified. It is the legal sphere, the domain of positive law, for the 
law is the sovereign’s command. He is the bearer of legislative power 
legibus solutus, but it does not follow that his absolute power is tyrannical 
and unlimited, for this would contradict the notion of sovereignty as lawful 
power. No sovereign power is possible if there are no free subjects (franc-
sujets), if it does not at least ensure a formal equality to all its subjects, re-
gardless of secondary, social differences. It is true that Bodin deserves credit 
for discovering the internal logic of sovereignty, which can be aptly ex-
pressed by the formula: sovereignty is the general and formal nature of po-
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litical power as the unified, indivisible, permanent and absolute legal power 
in the State. But it is Hobbes’s scrutiny of sovereignty that marks the crucial 
stage in the development of modern political thought. Hobbes’s analysis of 
sovereignty (power) is the “first modern theory of the modern State”. Con-
sequently, one may assert that “Hobbes is possibly the greatest political 
philosopher of the modern age “ (cf. Passerin d’Entrevès, 1969: 127-129, 
133-144; italics added). 
 We owe the crucial step towards the comprehension of historical and 
theoretical shaping of the State and the logic of sovereignty to the investiga-
tions of Q. Skinner. His renowned study The State (1997, 11989) is a precise 
reconstruction of the historical shaping and “crystallisation of the concept of 
the State”. In the pre-modern view, political power was conceived as per-
sonalised domination. Hobbes was the first to successfully carry through a 
breach with this traditional conception, which had been gradually relin-
quished from as early as the 14th century. The republican tradition of the 
Renaissance played a key role in the process, for in it the idea assumed 
shape for the first time of the State as an autonomous form of political au-
thority, which regulates public matters of an independent community and 
has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in its own civitas or respub-
lica. Still, the classical republican theorists made but the first step in con-
ceiving the “abstract notion of the State”. They rejected the identification of 
the ruler or magistrate with political power (they are nothing more than the 
highest-ranked public servants). Instead, they resorted to equalization of the 
State and the community of citizens, i.e. of the sovereignty of the State and 
the sovereignty of the people. With Hobbes, at last, the modern apprehension 
takes shape that there has to be a doubly impersonal form of political au-
thority, which must be sharply distinguished from both the ruling and the 
ruled. For this reason, it is precisely Hobbes’s political thought (and not the 
republican political theory) that merits the designations of epochal revolu-
tionary conception of the State or “conceptual revolution”. 
 According to Skinner, however, theoretical advocating of the State must 
be recognized as an “ideology of State power”, which is a product of the 
earliest “major counter-revolutionary movement in modern European his-
tory, the movement of reaction against the ideologies of popular sovereignty 
developed in the course of the French religious wars, and, subsequently, in 
the English Revolution of the seventeenth century” (Skinner, 1997: 9, 11, 
13, 16-18). 
 In the final version of the study, entitled “From the state of princes to the 
person of the state”, the central point of Hobbes’s theory of State sover-
eignty is pointed out with even more resolution and plausibility. Hobbes was 
the “first philosopher to enunciate a fully systematic and self-conscious the-
ory of the sovereign state”. It was precisely Hobbes who first demonstrated 
the meaning of the fundamental thesis stipulating that sovereignty was “the 
property of an impersonal agency”. “More clearly than any previous writer 
on public power, Hobbes enunciates the doctrine that the legal person lying 
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at the heart of politics is neither the persona of the people nor the official 
person of the sovereign, but rather the artificial person of the state” (Skinner, 
2002a: 368-369, 403-404, 413). 
 There seems to be no doubt that Skinner’s comprehensive synthesis, Vi-
sions of politics (I-III), represents the greatest contemporary hermeneutical 
contribution to a fitting conception and reception of Hobbes’s doctrine of the 
State. In his methodically crucial study on Hobbes, Skinner provides a pre-
cise clarification of Hobbes’s “theory of public power”, shedding light on 
the meaning of the obscure thesis that the “true ‘subject’ of any lawful state 
must be the person of the state itself” (Skinner, 2002b: 177-208). Since con-
temporary political life also revolves around the notion of sovereignty, a re-
examination of Hobbes’s theory, rather than being of merely historical inter-
est, is a matter of eminent philosophical significance.2 A fortunate blend of a 
strict theorist and a great historian (not only of political ideas), Skinner pro-
posed an interpretation of Hobbes’s conceptual system (e.g. the State, sover-
eignty, freedom), which is thus far the greatest achievement in the constant 
critical scrutiny of the epochal relevance of Hobbes’s political theory.3 
 
Hobbes’s Theory of the State and Sovereignty in Leviathan 
 In what way do the above-mentioned insights of political theory4 regard-
ing the origins and nature of the sovereign State enable us to approach ade-
quately the comprehension of Hobbes’s conceptual system?5 
 
2 Within the scope of this work I will refer quite briefly to Skinner’s interpretation of 
Hobbes. At present it is widely known and has already been incorporated into the standard text-
books; e.g. John Pike, Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan, pp. 68-98; (in: Warburton, Nigel / Pike, John 
/ Matravers, Derek, 2000: 100-134). 
3 Skinner’s valuable contribution is worthy of a separate discussion; cf. a fine review of 
Skinner’s scientific opus in: Kari Palonen, 2003: Quentin Skinner. History, Politics, Rhetoric, 
Polity, Cambridge; specifically on Hobbes: 109-115; 145-151). It need also be said that the An-
glo-centric character of contemporary political science results in a plainly unwarranted over-
shadowing of other excellent contributions within the secondary literature on Hobbes. I have in 
mind, in particular, the works of the French political philosopher Y.Ch. Zarka (1995, 1999) and 
his part in the momentous (international) project, the object of which was the publication of a 
critical edition of French translations of Hobbes’s complete works in 17 volumes (published by 
J. Vrin). Skinner himself can testify to this overshadowing. For he observes in his minute exe-
gesis of Hobbes’s 16th chapter on the State as an artificial person, on citizens as creators, and on 
the sovereign as their representative and actor, that it is “remarkable how many surveys of 
Hobbes’s thought – even the best recent surveys – tend to glide past these issues in silence”. In 
a subsequent note he further elaborates, stating that such a lack of interest is characteristic of 
“Anglophone commentators. By contrast, the French literature includes a number of important 
studies of the personne of the state”. He then refers, inter alia, to Zarka (1999) (cf. Skinner, 
2002b, notes 8 and 120 only). However, Zarka’s analysis of the issue is worthy of genuine and 
full attention (Zarka, 1995: 325-356).  
4 I will mention here but a small selection of works essential to the acquisition of integral 
insight into the controversial issue of sovereignty. Cf. in particular B. Barret-Kriegel (1986, 
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 First and foremost, it must be said that the Leviathan is the epochal an-
swer to the central modern-age problem of the legitimacy of (political) au-
thority, as opposed to the traditional problem of the best political regime.6 
 At the very core of the said epochal answer lies the theory of the emanci-
patory role of the sovereign State as a politico-juridical project, which im-
plies the subjectification of man as legal person and free subject. The sover-
eign State is not a repressive instance of arbitrary force, but a legal and po-
litical institution of rational political power. As such, it is society-making; it 
produces a society of free individuals. According to Pierre Manent: 
“Ce que fait le pouvoir, c’est la société. Le pouvoir est l’instrument de 
la socialisation, d’une socialisation continuée puisque la société n’est 
pas naturelle. L’unité qui fait la société est imposée de l’extérieur aux 
individus par le Souverain; en l’absence de ce dernier, il n’y a que 
multitudo dissoluta. Le pouvoir est le moyen par lequel la socialisa-
tion négative, guerrière, de l’état de nature est convertie en socialisa-
tion positive, pacifique” (Manent, 1977: 65). 
 The central thesis, methodically, in the comprehension of the State and 
the logic of sovereignty, is the acknowledgement of the mutually constitu-
tive connection between the State and society, without which no genuine 
process of individual emancipation in modernity can be initiated. The State 
as the fundamental politico-juridical project of modernity is possible exclu-
sively as a process complementary to the effectuation of civil society as the 
fundamental politico-economic project of modernity. Thus, the sovereign 
State and civil society are quite modern creations, and their purpose is pri-
marily a legal and economic, and then also a political subjectification of in-
dividuals. 
 The State as a doubly impersonal form of public authority is functionally 
appropriate to civil society as a work- and exchange-based community of in-
dividuals/proprietors. Such a political power alone guarantees the necessary 
minimum of legal security and personal rights, and the predictability of con-
duct of all actors in the economic process. As a historical process of trans-
formation of political force into political power, State sovereignty is a mere 
 
1989, 1998), J. Bartelson (1995), Q. Skinner (2003), É. Balibar (2001), G. Mairet (1997), Ch. 
Merriam (1972/1900), F. L. Neumann (1957, 1986). 
5 Fortunately, any interpretation of Hobbes’s political theory can rely on indispensable 
contributions by numerous excellent interpreters, notably F. Tönnies (1896, 21927), L. Strauss 
(1936, 1953), M. Oakeshott (1946), C. B. Macpherson (1962, 1968), C. Schmitt (1938), P. Ma-
nent (1977, 1987), M. Villey (1957, 1968), Y.Ch. Zarka (1995, 1999). 
6 Cf. “La question fondamentale de la doctrine hobbienne est celle de l’obéissance: à qui 
suis-je tenu en conscience d’obéir?” The said question “ne jouait pas un rôle politique central 
dans la formulation classique, grecque, du problème politique. Celle-ci était sous-tendue par la 
question: quel est le meilleur régime politique? Ou encore: qui a le plus de titres à commander?” 
(P. Manent, 1987: 81-82). 
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illusion, unless it is based on suppression of destructive social power through 
the establishment of an institutional network of interest-related interdepend-
ence of individuals in the sphere of a possessive, civil society. 
 Sovereign power is, therefore, not a purpose unto itself, but a political 
and legal instrument whereby the state of nature is abolished and status lib-
ertatis of subjects, individually and as a whole, is ensured. But there is more 
to it than that, for it also guarantees the existence of a free sphere of move-
ment and intercourse among individuals/proprietors. In other words, the fun-
damental task of sovereignty is to make possible the establishment and de-
velopment of a civil, market-based society. 
 The abolition of the state of nature is by no means a clear-cut and one-
time operation. If one perceives Hobbes’s construction of State sovereignty 
solely as a synchronic logical construction, one fails to grasp its scope. It is 
true that his construction is suitable for a full expansion of private initiative 
under the protection of laws as general and formal legal norms, which are 
attuned to the well-perceived individual interest, i.e. the urge to appropriate. 
That is the liberal aspect of Hobbes’s conception of the State, where the 
State is seen as a political power in which force is institutionalized and trans-
formed into a legal order.7 
 But it is also true that the logic of Hobbes’s construction of the State, 
even independently of his explicit statements, indicates a dynamic-dia-
chronic aspect of sovereignty as a politico-juridical project. Namely, the 
project cannot possibly aim at a “leap” out of the natural state of negative 
socialisation, but rather at a gradual and lasting establishment of a new, le-
gal, political and social state – a modern civil society; or, to put it differently, 
at a tendentially all-embracing legal normalisation of the political body and 
a moral education of its members. 
 Can the sovereign be successful in this? 
 Everything depends on the epistemological status of the state of nature.8 
Is status naturalis conceived ontologically, as the underlying structure of 
man’s subsistence in which man’s true nature is revealed (the way Hobbes 
himself seems to conceive it)? Or else is it an epochal constellation of a new 
historical reality of a completely possessive and market-based society, as 
C.B. Macpherson enunciated in his classical interpretation (1981, 1984)? 
 
7 Cf. “The raison of Hobbes’s jusnaturalistically constructed absolutist State is a liberal one 
[...] Hobbes is the real founder of liberalism” (Habermas, 1980: 72-74). 
8 On the “politico-theological” origins of the “state of nature” concept and its importance as 
“notion clef de la réflexion politique, et qui le restera pendant plus d’un siècle, pendant la 
période formatrice des régimes libéraux modernes: l’état de nature, c’est la condition des hom-
mes avant toute obéissance à la cité ou à l’Église, condition à partir de laquelle on pourra con-
struire un corps politique invulnérable à leur conflit”, see P. Manent, 1987: 85-86; italics 
added). 
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 The answer to this crucial question depends on the comprehension of the 
method and structure of exposition in Hobbes’s systemic political writings 
(primarily in Leviathan, but also in The Elements and De Cive), and on the 
status of the “state of nature” concept in those writings. According to the 
usual interpretation, the state of nature is the incontestable logical prerequi-
site and the starting point of exposition, for it is the result of application of a 
resolutive-compositive method, i.e. of dissolution of the political body to its 
elementary constituents – the individual wills of the political body’s mem-
bers. The said interpretation, however, seems to be questionable (e.g. Cas-
sirer, 1982: 255-260). Namely, the conceptual definition of the state of na-
ture simply is not the starting point of exposition in Leviathan. The chapter 
on the state of nature (Hobbes refers to the “natural condition of Mankind”) 
is but the 13th chapter of the first part on man! Macpherson pointed out the 
problem: in his notable preface to Leviathan, having closely followed 
Hobbes’s line of argument in the opening chapters on man as a self-activat-
ing urge-driven machine, he noted that the “logical abstraction” of the “hy-
pothetical state” was not at all necessary to Hobbes, for he was perfectly able 
to infer the indispensability of a permanent sovereign power on the basis of 
previously expounded anthropological theses regarding the nature of man 
(preface to Leviathan, Macpherson, 1980: 40-41). The problem seems to be 
difficult to solve. If indeed Hobbes follows the resolutive-compositive 
method in his analysis of the political body, sound logic would require that 
he should begin with the state of nature. But he does not, and, according to 
Macpherson, he could even have avoided it altogether. Hobbes did not begin 
with the state of nature, but with considerations on man and his nature. And 
the latter can be fathomed through introspection, through analytical immer-
sion into one’s inner being. Which means that the true nature of man as a 
being is not uncovered in the so-called natural state of mankind, but through 
abstraction from it. In other words, the so-called state of nature is insuffi-
ciently natural, it is not the original state of mankind. It is merely the hypo-
thetical state of present-day man, assuming there is no political power and 
no positive laws. Thus, in chapter 13 on the state of nature, two aspects of 
man merge: man as such and man given in history. Apparently, their nature 
is identical. But only apparently! An immanent analysis may show the en-
tirety of determinations of man as an urge-driven and national being, and 
even encompass the natural laws as rational “precepts or general rules”, 
“propositions of peace” for the preservation of life. But it can definitely not 
encompass man as a being of conscience, a being with a Christian soul, 
which interiorizes natural laws as moral or divine laws. And precisely such a 
man-Christian in the hypothetical state of nature, when there is no compel-
ling (public) spiritual authority, is able to offer and impose on all an un-
equivocal interpretation of natural or divine laws. 
 In this way, contextual elements of a given historical situation are in-
serted in the purely logical construction of the state of nature. Hobbes un-
doubtedly aspired to elevate the nature of historically-given man into the 
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ontological discourse of contemplation of man in abstracto.9 But the specific 
considerations in the very chapter on the state of nature prove to be quite 
contingent. Thus Hobbes appeals to the reader’s experience in order to rein-
force his conclusion that nature sets people apart and incites mutual con-
flicts.10 He is even more off the mark when he asserts that “there are many 
places, where they [people] live so now [in such a state]”, stating as an ex-
ample “the savage people in many places of America”, who “live at this day 
in that brutish manner” (L, 13, 187). 
 In my judgement, and in spite of Hobbes’s obvious uncertainties and 
inconsistencies, the state of nature (substantially defined in chapter XIII), 
denotes a specific historical constellation, the exceptional situation of reli-
gious “civil” wars.11 It is a transitional historical constellation, which 
characterizes the final transition from the seigniorial feudal pre-state to the 
new, modern state. Namely, the state of nature provides us with a notion of 
the behaviour of people in general, and each man in particular, assuming that 
there is no efficient power and no indisputable political authority. In this 
state of general insecurity and conflict, people do not fight each other merely 
out of the urge for self-preservation. Competition, mistrust and fame are not 
the sole causes of the “war of everyone against everyone”, nor are gain, se-
curity and esteem its sole objectives. Such a state would, in fact, not be war12 
 
9 Without delving into the more involved considerations regarding Hobbes’s theoretical 
starting point and the logic of his argument, everything leads to the conclusion that two concepts 
of the “state of nature” can be discerned in Hobbes’s theory. The state of nature is conceived 
either as a logical abstract hypothesis (pertaining to man as being) or as a historical hypothesis 
regarding the character of man’s existence in his time (the religious-civil war period). A me-
thodical separation of the two concepts (which Hobbes himself did not carry through) prompts 
the conclusion that the existing “natural” state cannot be subject to criticism from the standpoint 
of the authentic state of nature, nor the existing belligerent man from the standpoint of man’s 
original nature. Hobbes finds it important to show that there is no substantial basis and no an-
thropological norm for overcoming the current unhealthy social (“natural”) state, i.e. that no 
healthy state of nature exists. This is precisely why one has the impression that there is but a 
single state of nature concept. 
10 What does man do, Hobbes asks the reader: “when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, 
and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his 
house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, 
armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, 
when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and 
servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as 
Y do by my words?” (L, XIII, p. 187). The above is not the experience of man in general in any 
form of living together, neither in Hobbes’s time nor in any other time. 
11 Cf. the judgement of the great historian Koselleck: “It is Hobbes who is paradigmatic for 
the genesis of the modern theory of the State from the situation of religious civil wars [...] 
Hobbes unambiguously developed his theory of the State, with the historical situation of civil 
war as his starting point” (Kozelek, 1997: 51). 
12 Cf. “...dans la doctrine de Hobbes, cette notion [l’état de nature] n’apparaît pas comme 
l’hypothèse à laquelle conduit le projet de surmonter le conflit entre la politique et la religion, 
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in the sense of “battle only, or the act of fighting”. No, its logic is conveyed 
by the tendency towards conflict with no guarantees for peace. The prob-
lems reach deeper, and the fiercest conflicts are of a different character. 
 The first and deepest drawback of man’s state of nature results from the 
logic of qualitative equality among people, from their equality as believers. 
Religious war of all against all is the inevitable consequence of the right of 
each man/believer to consider his own conscience as the highest instance of 
interpretation of natural or divine laws. Man is definitely not a being whose 
nature is determined solely by urges and calculative understanding. No, he is 
also a being of conscience, a Christian believer. Consequently, he strives 
with all his might to escape the state of nature, for, apart from it being physi-
cally unsafe and dangerous, the state of nature is morally unbearable. 
 The second drawback of the so-called state of nature is the fact that 
enlightened people live in it, people imbued with “wrong” ideals of antique 
freedom and republican dignity. Unsubmissive people, who tolerate no 
master, and who perceive any rule of One as vicious tyranny. People “de-
ceived by the specious name of Libertie”, besotted by the spiritual authority 
of “Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romanes”, who errone-
ously taught them that man is free only if he lives under democratic govern-
ment. Consequently, “it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and Change of 
Government” (L, XXI, p. 267).13 
 Therefore, the fundamental conflicts between people in the state of na-
ture do not result from conflicts between unrestrained urge-driven beings, 
i.e. from their mutually conflicting subjective rights: causa belli civilis re-
sults primarily from the fact that strict and fanatical adherence to one’s own 
moral duties and political beliefs – with everyone aspiring to their public and 
objective validity – immerses man in ruthless religious and civil wars (see 
Kozelek, 1997: 58; Đinđić, 2003: 42). 
 This is what the “representative sovereign” is faced with; his essential 
political task and statesman’s duty is to overcome such a catastrophic situa-
tion, in which the very survival of man is at stake. Man’s nature, religious 
duties, republican libertarian beliefs – none of them can bring people to-
gether in a political community. It is according to this criterion that one must 
evaluate in full earnestness how demanding the sovereign’s task actually is: 
 
mais comme la réalité produite par le conflit réel: la guerre de tous contre tous. C’est pourquoi 
du reste il préfère l’expression de natural condition of mankind à celle de l’état de nature. Mais 
dans sa signification essentielle, l’état de nature n’est pas état de guerre” (Manent, 1987: 86). 
13 With a malignant inference which greatly tarnished Hobbes’s reputation: “And by read-
ing of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a 
false shew of Liberty) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their 
Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I 
think I may truly say, there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have 
bought the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues” (L, 21, pp. 267-268; italics added). 
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everything depends on his political skill (see Manent, 1987: 56). And politi-
cal skill, in turn, depends on the royal, salvation-bringing science of politics. 
 The course towards the overcoming of the existing “natural” state is set. 
First comes the forming of a completely de-politicized sphere of the sub-
jects’ freedom, accompanied by a full guarantee of their legal security and 
an unlimited scope to their individualism as proprietors. In addition to that, 
private consciences are neutralised and religious oppression of the political 
community is made impossible. 
 Why is the sovereign a reliable solution? Why is it deemed fit that he, as 
a public conscience established through an accord of natural human beings 
themselves, should be the interpreter and protector of natural laws as laws of 
peace? For the only reason that his natural right to self-preservation – i.e. to 
governing his own life according to his own judgement, entices him to fully 
respect the natural or divine laws, as necessary foundations of his positive, 
civil laws. Thus it can be said that the state of nature can only be abolished if 
“le Souverain reste dans l’état de nature et lui seul”; still, “parce qu’il est 
seul dans l’état de nature, l’état de nature se trouve aboli” (Manent, 1977: 
65; italics added). 
 The natural human beings do not enter the new legal state of peace, guar-
anteed by the sovereign/Christian, in order to alter their nature. They already 
are moral beings in the natural state, but precisely as such do they extermi-
nate one another like belligerent beasts. However, the “natural” moral beings 
do not constitute an ethical pre-political community of believers, for such a 
community cannot exist without a sovereign public conscience. Without a 
legitimate political authority, i.e. a representative sovereign, there can be no 
peaceful coexistence of believers, of people as moral beings. In order to be 
efficient, political power must also be legitimate. And it can be legitimate in 
the eyes and conscience of free subjects only if the sovereign is truly con-
vincing in his interpretation and protection of natural or divine laws. For 
these fundamental laws are the sole condition for the possibility of a perma-
nent civil state of positive socialisation.14 
 The reach of the dynamic-diachronic logic of sovereignty extends beyond 
Hobbes’s initial model of the sovereign or legal State. An absolute sovereign 
and radical de-politization are but the indispensable initial figures of the 
modern State and society. The sovereign’s differentiated juridization of hu-
man interrelations undoubtedly results in a successful transition to modernity 
in the political, economic and ethical sense. The development of civil soci-
ety, as a process of market-exchange formation of sociability, also implies a 
 
14 Cf. the judgement of the great philosopher of law: “...la loi naturelle demeure incessam-
ment à l’œuvre dans la vie du corps politique. Elle est son principe permanent [...] C’est un 
chapitre capital de la politique hobbesienne (comme, plus tard, de celle de Bossuet) que celui 
des devoirs du souverain. Rien ne marcherait dans le système s’il n’y avait la loi naturelle” 
(Villey, 2002: 603; italics added). 
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historical change in the very status of the political body’s member and of the 
sovereign. If (i.e. when) the sovereign successfully fulfils his fundamental 
society-making task, the initial type of the sovereign absolute State – which 
reduces individuals to free subjects – will no longer befit the developed civil 
society. To the immanent rationality of civil society a new type of State is 
appropriate: one which is characterized by full political subjectification of 
subjects as citizens (citoyens). 
 At present, when evaluating the cognitive and political potential of 
Hobbes’s political philosophy, we have no reason to consider ourselves cap-
tives of the “magnificent logical tyrant” (H. Arendt). Hobbes deserves that 
we read him seriously and with confidence. If we do so, we are sure to dis-
cover, to our surprise, that his work is not a strict system, but rather a search 
for a system, full of hesitation and contradiction (according to the convinc-
ing line of argument put forward by Michel Villey, 2002: 559-618). 
 It is precisely in the consistency and magnitude of this unique quest for 
comprehension of Common-wealth as the modern politico-economic com-
munity (Strpić, 1998) that lies the unreduced charm and the epochal rele-
vance of Hobbes’s “doctrine of politics” project (or even “Doctrine of the 
POLITIQUES”, L, 47, p. 715). The Leviathan is not a machine for boundless 
accumulation of power (Arendt, 2004, 11951: 186-196).15 On the contrary, it 
is an epochal remedy against the “natural” state of Behemoth. Hobbes is 
possibly not our salvation-bringing contemporary, but he most assuredly is 
not a fatal one. The sovereign State remains an unattained (unattainable?) 
politico-juridical project of transformation and legal pacification of force in 
the present-day historical “post-national” constellation (Lalović, 2002b). 
That is why we are “condemned” to revisit Leviathan in full earnestness time 
and time again. For we are theoretically faced with contemporary counter-
State eruptions of Behemoth, be it in the form of totalitarian movements of 
the 20th century, or of ethnic civil wars in the last decades thereof, or else, 
most recently, of “holy crusades” and imperial aspirations of the first great 
modern republic. As to our current preoccupation with the future, with 
nothing short of the end of the State as the epochal political creation and 
politico-juridical project, it is obvious that there can be no true insight in the 
matter without systematic research and valuation of the birthplace of the 
sovereign State theory. Which is none other than Hobbes’s political-theoreti-
cal work. 
Translated from Croatian by Damjan Lalović 
 
 
15 She evaluates Hobbes’s political theory as a daring and consistent philosophy of power: 
the Commonwealth has no basis and ultimate goal other than “accumulation of power”. In ad-
dition to that, she utters an apocalyptic prophecy that the Leviathan, as a finally procured ma-
chine for boundless accumulation of power, will be able to gradually “extend the reach of its 
tyranny to the entire world” (op. cit.). 
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